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IN "'HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----------00000----------
HAGGIS MANAGEMENT, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
v. 
TURTLE MANAGEMENT, INC., 
JEOFFREY MEACHAM, STEPHEN 
McCAUGHEY and DAN LEE BRIGGS, 
Case No. 19017 
Defendants-Respondents. 
----------00000----------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of an order granting a summary judgment in 
favor of Respondents, dismissing Appellant's complaint against 
three guarantors for the balance due under a secured promissory 
note. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant sued the principal debtor, Turtle Management, 
Inc., and three guarantors, to recover the balance due under a 
promissory note. The note was secured by collateral comprised of 
all of the assets of a private club and restaurant known as The 
Haggis. A default judoment was entered against the principal 
debtor and it subsequently declared bankruptcy. The Respondents 
answered and defended claiming, among other things, that the 
Appellant was barred from recovering a deficiency judgment 
against them because the Appellant r0quireJ tr 0• 
collateral in a commercially re2sonablP mannPr. 
discovery, which included interrogatories, depositions, extensive 
memoranda and oral argument, the Trial Court enterpd its order 
granting Respondents' Motion for Judgment and dismissed 
the complaint. Pursuant to stipulation, an Amended Surnrrary 
Judgment was entered, certifying the 1udgment as final in 
accordance with the provisions of RulP 54(d) of the Utah Pules of 
Civil Procedure. Appellant now appeals the Trial Court's 
granting of that suJT'JTiary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the Trial Court's 
Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's ccmpli'lint and an award of 
Pespondents rosts incurred in correction with this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant's Statement of FactB is, in substantial part, 
a superficial and, at times, an in<'lccurate recitation of the 
relationship between the parties to this action. Only 
collaterall::" does the discuss the undisp11ted material 
:"acts that were the founc1Ation of the Trial Cnurt'c: summar'! 
judgment. While the Appellant makes a number of bare 
contentions, only one conclusion m2v be drawn from th0 
undisputec1, material facts surrounding the and 
disposition of the collateral -- it was commercially unreasonable 
as a matter of law. 
On July 7, 1978, Turtle Management, Inc., purchased a 
restaurant and private liquor club, doing business as "The 
Haggis", from the Appellant. The promissory note executed by 
Turtle Management, Inc., and guaranteed by Respondents Meacham, 
Mccaughey and Briggs (RECORD pg. 6, 8-10), was secured by an 
agreement which, in part, provided: 
Securitv for the Note. As security for the payment of 
the unpaid part of the purchase price as evidenced by 
the Note, the Buyer hereby grants to Seller a security 
interest in Purchaser's furniture, fixtures, equipment, 
inventory, accounts receivable and proceeds therefrom. 
To further evidence such security interest, the 
parties, concurrently with the execution hereof, shall 
execute a security agreement in the form attached 
hereto as Exhibit • F" (the •Security Agreement•) 
vesting in the Seller such security interest. 
[Emphasis added.] (RECORD pg. 12) 
The security agreement granted the Appellant 
a security interest in and to the collateral 
described on Exhibit "A" hereto which is incorporated 
herein by reference, which collateral is now owned or 
hereafter may be acquired by the debtor; the proceeds, 
increases, products of such collateral; accessions 
thereto; and anv propertv which the debtor may receive 
on account of such collateral . [Emphasis added.] 
(RECORD pg. 16) 
The Appellant incorrectly states the promissory note was 
secured "only by the equipment and furniture" on the premises 
(Appellant's Brief, page 3). The promissory note was secured by 
virtually every item of tangible or intangible property used by 
or located in the business sold to the Respondents. Exhibit "A" 
to the Security Agreement included all fixtures, decorations, 
paintings, Mirrors, signs, light hr1r '",t,·r,lr, 
ch?irs, brass rails, safP, rugs, the spittnor1, stuff0d 
stereo, antique bar, sinks, ice hins, metal storaae JUice 
mixers, curtains, plants, booths, tahles, dishwashers, 
racks, piano, blenders, brass boarders, grill, ovens, vent and 
hood system, sandwich counter, meat cutter, broilers, fryers, 
freezers, cassettes, walk-in refrigerators, storage bins, 
silverware, glasses and even the knives and forks. (See Exhibit 
"E" to Deposition of Terrell Wesley Smith.) The Appellant sold 
the entire business and, pursuant to the security agreement, 
repossessed the entire business; not just equipment and 
furniture. 
The total sales price of the business was $350,000, of which 
$300,000 was represented to be the net worth of the hard assets 
(fixtures, furniture, equipment, inventory, accounts) and $50,000 
to be the value of the going business concern. [Deposition of 
Jeoffrey Meacham, p.29-30]. Appellant received a cash 
payment of $100,000 and 22 monthly payments of $4,950, for a 
total cash paid of $208,900 up to the date of Turtle Management's 
default. 
The Appellant also received a guaraf'tl"P nf the promissnrv 
note executed by Respondents, under which they Jointly and 
severally guaranteed to Appel!ant the payment of the prnmissorv 
note signed by Turtle Manaqement. (RECORD pg. 8) 
4 
Turtle Management operated the business until July, 1980, 
when business conditions forced its closure and the subsequent 
filing for the liquidation in the bankruptcy court (In re: Turtle 
Management, Inc., United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah, Case No. 80-01829.) Payments upon the promissory note 
ceased. This lawsuit was filed July 29, 1980. (RECORD pg. 2) 
In August, 1980, the Appellant repossessed the business 
premises and, with minor exceptions, all property covered under 
the security agreement. (RECORD pg. 260; Deposition of Terrell 
Wesley Smith, pg. 34) The Trustee of Turtle Management's 
bankruptcy recognized the security agreement and repossession by 
abandoning the bankruptcy estate's interest in all assets 
comprising The Haggis Club and Restaurant. 
On September 8, 1980, and on October 13, 1980, the 
Respondents filed their Answers to the Complaint alleging, among 
other things, the Appellant's duty to dispose of the repossessed 
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. (RECORD pg. 26, 
41) 
In October, 1980, the Appellant disposed of the business and 
all of its assets to Eelsew, an unincorporated association of the 
principals of the Appellant, Steve Strasser; Howard Landa, an 
attorney; Terrell Smith, an attorney; and John Landon. The 
Appellant receivPd no consideration for this transfer (RECORD pg. 
255), gave no not ice to Respondents or the public and did not 
advertise the assets as being for sale. 
5 
In January, 1981, the businPsS and its ilcc•'ts \H'r" ""·11'1 
disposed of, this time to FelsPW, Inr., a ' .. l"'s"" 
officers and shareholders were those sarnP principals. thP 
1'.ppellant received no consideration, gave no not ire to the 
Respondents or the public and conducted no advance advertisino of 
the sale. 
The Appellant admits the August, 1980, repossession o• the 
business was because of Turtle Management's default upon the note 
and security agreement [Deposition of Howard Landa, p.5SJ; that 
the business and its assets were conveyed without consideration 
to Eelsew, the unincorporated association [Deposition of John 
Pranklin Landon, p.19-20; Deposition of Howard Landa, p.56]; that 
Felsew's entire interest in the repossessed business and property 
was then assigned to EelsPW, Inc. [Deposition of Hnward Lc>nda, 
p.55]; and, that this convevance was a private sale of which 
Turtle Management and the guarantors were given no notire 
[Deposition of Howard Landa, p.56, p.63] It is also admitted 
that Eelsew, Inc., the corpor2tion, was, 1.•ith the <>xceptinn rif 
Howard operated by the same prinripals as the Appellant 
[Deposition of John Pranklin Landon, 
Eelsew, Inc., 0peri'lted the club and res'=r>urant urc"il 0uly, 
1Q81, when the same business and were aoain trans•crrcd 
and sold, a third time, t0 Chianti Marc?oemen'= Inr., 
anothPr Utah c0rporation, for 5110,000. ( PEC()FJ; r,a. :' (, i I 
was no allocatior. of the $110 ,onn purrh,1sc pricP "" 
en1i1pm0nt, leasehnld imprnvements, goodwill, etc. (RECORD pg. 
No notice of this private sale or of the other two 
previous private sales was aiven to the Respondents (RECORD pg. 
264), even though this lawsuit was pending and each guarantor had 
formally appeared and was represented by counsel known to the 
Appellant. None of the three sales had the benefit of 
advertisement, public notice, or solicitation of offers to 
purchase. (RECORD pg. 2 6 fi) 
Appellant admits that, with a few minor exceptions, it 
repossessed the same business and assets originally sold to 
Turtle Management [Deposition of Terrell Wesley Smith, pg.34]. 
While the business required some rehabilitation in the form of 
cleaning and painting, primarily painting [Deposition of John 
Franklin Landon, lines 7 and 8, pg .19] , no basic changes were 
made to the business or its assets before any of the three sales. 
Appellant's Brief alleges it expended approximately $80,000 
in rehabilitation of the premises. (page 7) However, the record 
establishes only $34,000 in rehabilitation costs [RECORD pg.353], 
and Appellant admits certain capital improvements were performed 
at the time of repossession and that the includes both 
improvements and clean-up [Deposition of Terrell Wesley Smith, 
pg.26-27]. Appellant is unable to allocate the cost of 
improvement the cost of clean-up though it has conceded that 
the business onlv required a general cleaning and painting. 
same business ancl the same assets it h2c' 0riqinull;· "'Id t0 
Turtle Management [Deposition 0f TerrPll r.411 
that the promissory note was secured by the entire business and 
its assets. Most important, however, is the Appellant's 
admission that the hard assets which it repossrssed had a 
rerlacement value of between $400,000 and $500,000 [Deposition of 
Terrell Wesley Sr.iith, pg.36,37]. 
Rased upon the forPqoinq, Respondents made Motions for 
Sumrnary Judgment on the grnunds that, under these undisputed 
facts, Appellant was barred !rom recoverinq a deficiency judgment 
against the guarantors. Those Motions were granted. l\rpelL'lnt 
then filed a Supplemental Motion to Vacate Sumrnap; Judament. 
(RECORD pg. 378-379) The content of that motion is clearly 
demonstrative of Appellant's unreasonable handling of the 
collateral. The following excerpt reveals that Appellant was 
to and could do almost anything with the collateral, ever 
though title to the same had changed hancls three times . 
. on the further grounds that Plaintiff can arrange 
to reassume possessi0n and ownership of the collateral 
or its proceeds which is the subject mat•er nf the 
Security Agreement. 
Plaintiff moves this Court that a sale bP held in i'1 
reasonable manner within 30 days. 
As grounds for this Plaintiff stcit0s tha'= it 
can obtain the collateral for sa 1 o to protect thP 
Defendants' interest. 'l'hR collat0r0l is nnt thP type 
to have diminished in _v_a_l_u_e __ a_n_d-,--1-· n __ f_a_c_t_, --ma-.. -, -h-, a ......... \,-'-e 
increased in value. 
B'.i ordering the sale nf the col lateral the rights of 
the Defendants will hP prn+Prted and no prejudice can 
result from this 
In the alternative Plaintiff states that there has been 
a mistake and apparPntly the collateral has not been 
"sold" by the Plaintiff and, therefore, the Summary 
Judgment was improper [Emphasis added] (RECORD pg. 
378-379). 
A copy of the Supplemental Motion has been included in the 
Appendix to this Brief. 
That Supplemental Motion was properly denied by the Trial 
Court. Appellant now appeals the granting of Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IF THE SALE OF COLLATERAJ OCCURS WITHOUT NOTICE 
TO THE DEBTOR AND IS COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLE, 
THE SECURED PARTY MAV NOT RECOVER A DEFICIENCY. 
A secured party's duties in disposing of collateral are set 
forth in Section 70A-9-504 (3) Utah Code Ann., (1953). This 
Court, in FMA Financial Corp. ''· Pro-Printers, Inc., 590 P.2d 803 
(Utah, 1977), restated that st,,tute, in part, and emphasized its 
important requirements to a disposition of collateral: 
Disposition of collateral may be by public or private 
proceedings and ma v be made bv wa v of one or more 
contracts. Sale or. other disposition may be as a unit 
or in parcels and at any time and place and on any 
terms but everv aspect of the disposition including the 
method, manner, time, place and terms must be 
rommerciallv reasonable. . reasonable notification 
•he time and place of an" public sale or reasonable 
9 
notification of the timP aftPr which an" pn'"'"P s,11•' 
0r other intended disposition is to Lf' rr,,-,dr chzillTJP 
sent bv the secured partv to thP debtor . 590 
at 806 citing §70A-9-504 (3) Utah Code 
'All emphasis is supplied by thP Court.] 
Ann., 
Likewise, the duties imposPd en the secured creditor by this 
section are owed '10t only to the principal debtor hilt: also to any 
guarantors of the obligation. Zion's First Bank v. 
Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031 (Utah, 1977), FMA Financial Corp., supra. 
In granting Summary JudgmPnt, the Trial Court was reauired 
to analyze the pertinent provisions 0f the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code as interpreted by this Court. It also considered 
the following undisputed acts of Appellant in disposing of the 
collateral. 
July 1980 - Turtle defaults 
July 28, 1980 - Complaint filed 
August 1980 - Appellant repossesses collateral, 
including the business, lease-
hold improvements, furniture, 
fixtures, eauipment and inventory. 
September 8, 1980 - Mccaughey and Briggs Answer filed 
alleging collateral must be 
disposed of reasonablv 
October 13, 1980 - Answer filPd 
alleqjng collateral must be 
disposed o:: reasonabl" 
October 2 8 , 198 O 
F'IPST TRANSFFF 
* * * * * 
Haggis, Inc., transfers club and 
assets to Eelsew fan asscciatic'1 
of thP princip<1ls of Haqai'.o, Ir.c. I 
transfer had: 
l 0 
January 23, 1981 
SECOND TRANSFER 
July 2 2, 19 81 
THIRD TRANSFER 
(1) NO consideration; 
(2) NO advertising; 
(3) NO notice to guarantors 
or their counsel. 
Eelsew transfers club and assets 
to Eelsew, Inc. (a Utah corpora-
tion incorporated January 23, 
1981) This transfer had: 
(1) NO consideration; 
(2) NO advertising; 
(3) NO notice to guarantors 
or their counsel. 
Eelsew, Inc., transfers club and 
assets to Chianti, Inc. (a Utah 
corporation). This transfer had: 
(1) a $110,000 purchase price; 
(2) NO advertising; 
(3) NO notice to guarantors 
or their counsel. 
The end result of that analysis was the Trial Court's correct 
conclusion that these actions, when considered cumulatively, and 
in conjunction with §70A-9-504 (3), Utah Code Ann., (1953), 
constituted a commercially unreasonable disposition of the 
collateral as a matter of law. 
Appellant's first argument appears to be that §70A-9-507(1) 
Utah Code Ann. , (19 5 3) , which al lows a debtor to seek damages 
from the secured creditor in the event of a commercially 
unreasonable sale, is the exclusive remedy for a debtor against a 
creditor who has not complied with the provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. This position is simply not supported by the 
cases which have interpreted this section of the Code. In FMA 
11 
Financial Corp. I supra, the trinl r:nurt -ln -,r,l1'r dr>n'!1 nn 
the creditor a deficiency judgment. ()n appeal, tht-· r·rr1..:ilt-0r 
asserted that the exclusive remed;· nf the debt0r was tr·, 
damages. This Court disagreed with the crPditor, affirmea the 
trial court, and stated: 
Although the Uniform Commercial Code dces not expressly 
providP for the fol lowing r<"mPdy, many courts r_a•re hP 1 c" 
the secured party may nbtain no deficienry from the 
creditor if it fails to give the debtor ;:-f•asonable 
notice. [footnote] Other courts have held +:hat the 
debtor's exclusiv<" remedy is set nut in Article 9. 
If the disposition has occurrf'd, the 
debtor or any person entitled to not:fication 
. has a right tn rf'couer from the srcured 
party any loss caused by the failurP to 
comply with the provision of this part 
[citing §70A-9-507(1) Utah Code Ann., 
( 19 5 3) l . 
While we noted thP existPnce of the abO'.'e sf'ction in 
Zion's First National Bank v. Hurst, supra notP. 7 "-'" 
do not believe it to be the dP.btor's Pxclusive remedy. 
Id. at 807. 
In spitP. of Appellant's claim, that decisinn was in no wa:· 
affected bv this Court's derision in Utah Bank and Trust v. 
Quinn, 622 '.'93 (Utah, 19RO), inasmuch as the opin.i.nn did nnt 
deal with the statute relied upon by Appellant. Tr, short, thP 
lew in Utah presently allows a debtor to SUP a c;:-rditnr fnr 
connected with imprrppr coll3teral disprs't1on but that 
is a remedv separate 2nd apart the of whrthPr nr 
not a creditor r.i0y i::ecover. a ludgm0nt a 
debtor when the creditor has not fol!owed thP rules orescrihrd 
for him by the Unjf0rm CommP.rcial Code. 
1 " 
Tr 1•s Prief, Appellant appears to argue that the sole basis 
tnr the Tried r:onrt' s decision barrino a deficiency against 
Respondents was the undisputed fact that no notice of any of the 
dispositions of the collateral was given to the guarantors. In 
making that argument, Appellant chooses to ignore the other facts 
which the Trial Court chose not to ignore, namely: the number of 
transfers; the absence of consideration; the lack of public 
advertising; the failure to solicit bids; and the private nature 
of each of the three transfers. In short, Appellant claims the 
Trial Court adopted a "no notice, no deficiency" rule and, in so 
doing, misinterpreted the line of decisions handed down by this 
Court. Such is simply not the case as is evidenced by analysis 
of the applicable Utah cases. 
The question of the propriety of a deficiency judgment in a 
case such as this has been addressed many times by this Court. 
The following historical analysis of those cases demonstrates and 
supports the proposition that at the very minimum if no notice of 
a disposition of collateral is given and if the sale is 
commercially unreasonable, then the secured party may not recover 
a deficiency. 
In Zion's First National Bank, supra, Plaintiff, the secured 
creditor, failed to give notice to the Defendant, a personal 
guarantor of the obliqatinn, of the sale of the certain 
col lateral. Defendant claimed that failure to so notify 
precluded the Plaint1•f from <:>btaining any deficiency judgment 
1 3 
2gainst him. 
niven the Defendant notice, but stated 
. The usual rule is failure to sc notify docs 
not release the debtor frnm any deciciency ric1y 
arise; but upon such failure he rnciy get credit fnr (or 
recover) only fnr any loss caused by the c2ilure tn so 
notify. Id. at 1033, 1034. 
The Court cited §70Jl-9-507 Utah Code Ann., (1953), as authnrit.y 
fnr this conclusion and upheld the deficiency. 
This Court subsequently modified Zion's First Natinnal Bank, 
supra, in FMA Financial Cnrporation, supra. In this ccise, the 
Defendant-debtor orally requested the Plaintiff, secured 
creditor, to take the equipment and sell it. Plaintiff did take 
the equipment, stnred it in a garage for eight months and without 
notifying Defendant, eventually sold the equipment. The Court 
stated that even though the Defendant had requested Plaintiff to 
pick up and sell the equipment, this, in no way, constituted a 
waiver of Defend2nt's right to notice of the time and nature of 
the dispnsition. Id. at 807. The Court then stated that: 
. The purpose of the notice requirement is for the 
protection of the debtor, by perrnittinq him to bid at 
the sale, or arrange for interested parties to bid, and 
to otherwise assure that thP sale is conducted in 2 
commercially reasonable manner. The danger resulting 
from not notifving the debtor of the sa i_c cf secured 
property is that the property may he sold for an amount 
unreasonably below its market value, burdeninq the 
debtor with liabilitj• for the deficiency. Id. 
In holding for the Defendant, the Court concluded that: 
Because F!',A did not give the required notice, crnd 
did not cnnduct the sale in a commerciall•; reasonable 
manner, it is barred from obtaining i deficienc" 
judgment. Id. at 808. 
1 4 
Althnugh the Court never so stated, the definite implication of 
this decision was that if a secured party did not give notice of 
a sale of collateral to the debtor, it is barred from obtaining a 
deficiency judgment. 
Then, in Utah Bank and Trust, supra, this Court discussed a 
refined position on the no notice, no deficiency rule. In that 
case, a father guaranteed certain obligations of his son which 
were secured by "exotic" cars. When the son defaulted, the 
father agreed that the Bank could place the cars on used car lots 
to be sold individually. The cars were advertised in local 
newspapers and the father even signed off on some of the titles 
when requested to do so. The proceeds were applied to the debt 
and a deficiency resulted. The father challenged the deficiency 
on the grounds of no notice and commercial unreasonableness in 
disposing of the collateral, but, under those facts, this Court 
upheld the deficiency and discussed in depth the manner in which 
§70A-9-504 (3), has been applied. 
The Court first noted the following three positions as to 
the effect of failure to give notice under the Comr.1ercial Code. 
1. Where there is no notice, there can be no deficiency 
judgment. 
2. Failure to give notice puts the burden of proof on the 
creditor to show that the sale of collateral took place in a 
commercially reasonable manner. 
l 5 
presnmption arises that the collateral had a ''illue P<1ucil tn, n1 
greater than, the debt. Id. at 796. 
In Utah Bank and Trust, supra, the Court hPld, under the 
facts of that casP, the "no notice, no deficienC'/" r11le was not 
applicable, but noted that in FMA Financial Corp., surra, ev<'n 
though no notice was given to the debtor, the decision not to 
grant a deficiency judgment was also based on the fact that sale 
of the collateral was not conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner and that there was evidence that the collaterill was of a 
value equal to, or greater than, the debt. Id. at 796. In any 
event, Appellant's reliance on Utah Bank and Trust, supra, is 
misplacecl given the fact differences between that case anc the 
case presentlv before the Court. 
After Utah Bank and Trust, supra, this Court in the C?'P of 
Strevell Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, fi46 P. 2d 741 (Utah, 
1982), eli'borated in dicta the significance of thP h0lding ir FMA 
Financial Corp., supra, and the irnportancP of the notice 
requirement irnposPd upon the creditor -- especiallv in cases of 
privatP sales. 
In Pro-Printers [FMJI. Financial], we barred a defirier<c"' 
judgment against guarantors where the creditor 
had repossessed the secured pr0pertv ar.c sole it at a 
private sale in a mannPr which was not corrcrnerri2ll" 
reasonable. The creditor had fai!ed to give th0 
auarantors notification of the salP, m.1kina it 
impossible for them to protect their subrogat:on riqhts 
and other intPcest in the outrornP of thc- ThP 
rule in Pro-Printers defines thP dutiPs cr0di to;=-;; 
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who U'possess col lateral. 
added l . 
Id. at 743. [Emphasis 
In the case presently before the Court, there were three 
private sales and the guarantors were not notified of any. 
Consequently, "it was impossible for them to protect their 
subrogation rights and other interests in the outcome of the 
sale[s]". Id. [Brackets added] 
The Appellant relies extensively upon Clark Leasing 
Corporation v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 
535 P.2d 1077 (1975), claiming that Utah Bank and Trust, supra, 
and the "vast majority of states" adopted the rule pronounced in 
Clark Leasing, supra. That case points out the Uniform 
Commercial Code's two requirements in the disposition of 
collateral after a repossession: The first is that notice be 
given to the debtor; and the second is that the sale must be 
commercially reasonable in all respects, including method, 
manner, time, place and terms. Both of these requirements are 
meant to see that a reasonable price is received for the 
collateral and to protect the debtor against any unfairly low 
price. Likewise, the holdings in those cases are not contrary to 
the Trial Court's decision in this case. 
Most recently, this Court in Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., v. 
Glaubensklee, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah, 1982), reversed the trial 
court's entry of a deficiency Judgment for the creditor and held 
as a matter of law that where there was not a commercially 
1 
reasonab]e sale then the creditor is not Pntitled tn 3 Jpcici 0 nr:• 
judgment. This Court succinctly stated: 
Because the sale in thP instant case was not ccrducted 
in a commercially reasonable rnanrer, is 
barred from obtaining a def ic iPnC'i judgment. :::d. at 
31. 
The issue then becomes: "Was the sale, or more 
were the sales commercially unreasonable as a matter of law given 
the fact that Appellant has admitted that no notice of any of the 
three transfers of the collateral was ever given to the 
Respondents?" 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S DISPOSITION OF THE COLLATERAL 
IN QT!ESTION WAS C'OMMERCIALLY UNREASONARLE 
AS A MA'l"C'F:R OF LAW 
In spite of the arguments contained in Appellant's Brief, 
its disposition of the collateral in question was 
unreasonable as a matter of law. It is undisputed that Appellant 
did not give any notice of the three transfers of the collateral; 
it is also undisputed that it did not advertise any oc the three 
transfers and it received no consideration for either of the 
two transfers. 
Of most importance is the fact that the Appellant itself has 
admitted the unreasonahle nature of thP of thP 
collateral when it requested the following of the Trial Court in 
its Supplemental Motion to VAcilte Surnmarv JudgmPnt (P0cord 
389-379; see also Appendix to this Brief) 
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Plaintiff moves th:s court that 
reasonablP manner within 30 days. 
a sale be held in a 
[Emphasis 
Section 7QA-9-504 ( 3), supra, imposes two obligations and one 
restriction on the secured creditor. First he must notify the 
debtor of any intended disposition of the collateral. In this 
case, it is admitted that no notice was given to any of the 
guarantors or their counsel of of the three sales. Secondly, 
the secured party must be certain that everv aspect of the 
disposition be commercially reasonable. Third, while a secured 
party may purchase the collateral at a public sale, he may not 
buy at a private sale unless the collateral is of such nature as 
to allow its value to be easily ascertainable. 
. The secured party may buy at any public sale and 
if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a 
recognized market or is of a type which is the subject 
of widely distributed standard price quotations he may 
buy at a private sale. Id. 
The commercially reasonable public sale of §70A-9-504, 
supra, was recently defined by this Court in Pioneer Dodge, 
supra: 
A public sale after default "has traditionally 
meant 'a sale in which the public, upon proper notice, 
is invited to participate and given full opportunity to 
bid upon a competitive basis for the property placed on 
sale, which is sold to the highest bidder.'" 
(Citations) The requirement of a public 
invitation is essential for a public sale under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. (Citations) It is 
fundamental that a public sale presupposes postino 
public notices or advertising. (Citations) . The 
Restatemert of Security §48 comment (1941) defines a 
public sale as "one to which the public is invited bv 
advertisement to 'lppear and bid at auction for 
gnods to be sold". 
; Q 
Presumably the essence of a 'public salP' 10-
that the relevant public is rot onlv invited 
to ?.ttend but is also infnrme<i, !:l'.' 
means of publicity m<'ly be appropr ;_rite, whPr. 
and where the sale is tn bP held. If tre 
sAle has not been puhlicized, 
it would not be a public sale no matter where 
it was held er it was conducted. Id. At 
30. [Emphasis added] 
In Pioneer Dodge, supra, the secured part'.' aa 11e notice of 
the intended sale to the debtor and then took the collateral, a 
truck, to five or six other dealers and obtained oral bids. It 
was also offered to wholesalers. Several davs later, it 
announced over a loudspeaker at its place of business that the 
sale of the truck was about to take place at auction. The 
secured party bought the truck. In reversing a deficiency 
judgment against the debtor as a matter of law, this Court held: 
These efforts did not aive reasonable notice to that 
part of the public which would likely be interested in 
the sale. Id. at 31. 
It is also interesting to note that the Court in this case citec 
FMA Financial Corp., supra, with approval and barred the 
deficiency judgment solely on the grounds that the sale was 
conducted in a commerciall;• unreasorable manner. 
It is impnssible to conceive how arv nf the three transfrrs 
made by Appellant were done under the auspices of a commerciall:: 
reasonable sale. The transfers of the club and its from 
Reggis, Inc., to Eelsew, er. association, thPr. tr EelsAw, Inc.,? 
corporation, and Chianti, Inc., entities sPparate and 
distinct from Appellant, were ccwo1d of ;_ 0 ,. 0 t ice. 
the three guarantors or •hpir counsel received any notice of any 
of the threP d1sposit1ons. There were no invitations to, nor 
opportun1tv for, the general public to bid competitively. 
Moreover, the first two transfers were made without 
consideration, surely an element of any commercially reasonable 
sale -- public or private. One cannot argue that the sale 
without consideration of the club and its assets from Appellant 
to Eelsew to Eelsew, Inc., comports with commercial 
reasonableness, when, but two years earlier, Appellant had sold 
the club to Turtle Management, Inc., for $350,000. It is now not 
justifiable to allow Appellant to claim that these transfers were 
only for convenience inasmuch as the title to the club and assets 
passed by virtue of the transactions thereby diluting, if not 
entirely eliminating, any chance of the Respondents to protect 
their rights in the collateral. 
The third transfer from Eelsew, Inc., to Chianti, Inc, was, 
as with the others, made without notice to the Respondents and 
without benefit of advertisement or public auction. Appellant, 
like the creditor in Pioneer Dodge, supra, did not give notice to 
that part of the general public who might be interested in the 
purchase of restaurant and private club equipment. In fact, 
Appellant did not formally solicit bids from anyone but Chianti, 
Inc. I RECORD pg. 2 5 =,, ? S l) , thereby exc 1 uding any other 
prospective buyers who could have increased the bidding price. 
A commercially reasonable public '"'1le is to e>ns'rcP 
a proper disposition of the assets at a fair and corrl'r• price as 
was stated in FMA Financial Corp., supra: 
The purpose of the notice requirement io, :or the 
protection of the debtor, by perl!'itting hi!11 to bid at 
the sale, or arrange for interested partiPS to bid, and 
to otherwise assure thAt the sale is in a 
commerciall1' reasonable manner. Thf' danger resultir.9 
from not nntifvinq the debtor of the Sa lP of secured 
property is thi{t thf' property may be sold for ar 2!1lourt 
unrPasonably below its markPt value, burdeninn the 
debtor with liability for the deficiency. Ironicallv, 
the notice requirement acts to the secured party's 
advantage; if the df>htor helps secure a hiqhP r sale 
price the securPd party is bPnefittPd, becausf' thP 
p:i:-ospect of recovering 2 r.:' deficiency is usu a 11" 
dubious. Id. at 807. 
Appellant's refusal tn qive Respondents or an'.' part of the 
general public or the business community an to bid en 
thP assets was in direct violation of the standards imposed by 
Pionef'r Dodge, supra, and, therefore, commercially unrPasorahle 
as a matter of law. 
Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Ann., (1953), also pPrrnits e> 
secured party to purchase collateral at a privatP sale but onlv 
if the collateral is of a type customarily sole' ir a recognized 
market or of a type which is the subject of widely distributed 
standard price quotations. This is for the protection cf the 
debtor to assure arm's-length transactions in the sale of the 
collateral and to permit the debtor to tPst the fairness of the 
sAle by comparison of thP price paid by the secured partv to 
standard price auotations. The characterization of collatPrnl as 
of a type customarily sold in a recognized nr the suh·0rt 
of widely-distributed, standard-price quotations cannot apply to 
dn ongoing business of a private liquor club. Even Appellant 
ndmits in its Brief, page 16, that a private club is an unusual 
item "much like the exotic cars in Utah Bank and Trust v. Quinn 
Appellant also admits that Eelsew and Eelsew, Inc., were 
associations of the Appellant's principals and that the 
collateral was privately transferred to those associations. 
The facts of this case are very similar to the facts of 
Jackson State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo., 1978), where the 
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's summary judgment 
barring a secured creditor's claim for a deficiency judgment. In 
that case, the Bank gave notice to the debtor that it intended to 
conduct a private sale of the automobiles it had earlier 
repossessed. Thereafter, the Bank consummated the sale by making 
an entry on its books that $50,000 had been applied as a credit 
towards the principal obligation. The Bank then concluded it 
could not legally enter into the automobile business and, 
therefore, transferred the collateral to a corporation formed and 
managed by two officers of the Bank. The collateral was 
ultimately liquidated in that business for $18,000. 
In holding for the debtor, the Court noted that the critical 
issue was whether or not the secured creditor had complied with 
the requirements of §34-21-963 (c) W.S.A, (1977), [§70A-9-504 (3) 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) I regardless of its motive. It concluded 
that it had J"'Ot because of thP wav it: disposed ,,c 
collateral. 
we would make the point t:hat a sPrured rrPdi tr;r 1-'ho 
purchas"s the collateral from hiroself, unlcs" hP r,1n 
bring himself within the "recognized f'12rkPt" or 
"standard price quotation" exceptions, i.s in thr> same 
direct violation of the requirements of the statut" as 
is the creditor who fails to aive notice. Id. at 170. 
In the case beforA this Court, Appellant did not aiv" notice 
as was donA in Jackson State Bank, supra. It transfr>rrPd the 
"unique" collateral privately twice unilaterally gi,.·ing 
Responde!"'ts a credit of approximately $30,000 on the prinripal 
debt. It then sold privately to a third person again without 
notice to Respondents all in violation of §70A-9-504 (31, supra. 
In suI1lI!lary, the reason the Trial Court concludPd that 
Appellant's disposition of the collateral was co!T1JT1ercially 
unr,,asonable as a matter of law was that thP Pppellant did 
absolutely nothing it was required to do, either under the 
Commercial Code or under the cases of this Court, interprPting 
those provisions. It did not give notice to any of the 
guarantors or their counsel; it privately transferred the 
collateral, which was unique in nature, first to Eelsew, the 
association, then to Eelsew, Inc., the corporation, and then, 
finally, to Chianti, Inc., a corporation; it did rct 
advertise any of the sales; it did not solicit bids; and the 
publir was not "invited to participate upon a compPti.tiue basis 
for the propert:r placed on sale", Pione0r Dodar, .ct 311, 
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anrl it unilatPrally determined the credit that was to be given 
Respondents. 
Appellant claims that the issue of commercial reasonableness 
of the disposition of the collateral is a factual issue and not 
proper for resolution by sununary judgment. That claim flies 
directly in the face of the undisputed facts set forth above. 
Appellant cannot point to even one act on its part which would 
fulfill any one of the requirements imposed upon it by the 
Conunercial Code in connection with the disposition of the 
collateral. That conclusion is further clearly supported by 
Appellant's Supplemental Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment, which 
shows the true nature of Appellant's handling of the collateral. 
The Trial Court concluded that the "gerrymandering" of the 
collateral by Appellant was not to be tolerated and the 
undisputed blatant disregard of the obligations imposed upon it 
under the Commercial Code were of such a nature as to require the 
conclusion that the disposition of the collateral was 
commercially unreasonable as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM A TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
UPON ANY CORRECT BASIS WHETHER OR NOT THAT 
BASIS WAS RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
In Goodsel v. of Business Regulations, 523 P.2d 
1230 (Utah, 1974), the trial court granted a Summary Judgment and 
declared certain portions of the Plumbers Registration and 
License Law unconstitutional. In affirl"inq tho court's 
decision, this Court cited with approval S C.J.S., Appeal and 
Error, §1464, and stated: 
The appellate court will affirTI' the Judgment, order or 
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on anv legal 
ground or theor:• <0.pparent on the record, even though 
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the 
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, 
and this is true even though such ground or theory is 
not urged or argued on appF'a 1 by appe i lee, was r.ot 
rc>ised in the lower court, and was not considered or 
passed on by the lower court. Id. at 1232. 
Therefore, if the trial court reaches the correct result in 
its decision even though there was another basis for it not 
relied on by the court below, then the Appellate Court wlll 
affirm. 
In this case, there are several grounds which will sustain 
the Trial Court's decision. Some are contained in the Pioneer 
Dodge, supra, decision, which was referred to by the Trial Court 
in its Memorandum Decision. Other related but independent 
grounds exist because of Appellant's failure tn col"nly with the 
provisions of the Commercial Code. Regardless of whnt specific 
grounds were relied upnn by the Trial Court, the undisputed facts 
appearing in the record when analyzed in conjunction with the 
provisions of the Corrmercial Code ard the decisions of this C0urt 
clearly show that the Trial Court's Judc!"ent was proper 
and should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
ThP evnlutinn of the law as it pertains to deficiency 
1udgments 2qainst debtors has reached at least the level that 
when there is nn notice to the debtor of the sale of the 
collateral and the secured creditor acts in a commercially 
unreasonable manner in disposing of the collateral, there can be 
no deficiency judgment against the debtor. That is not to say 
that in some cases there may be facts where the failure to notify 
the debtor of the sale alone may be sufficient grounds to bar the 
deficiency judgment. 
The errors and omissions of the Appellant in disposing of 
the collateral in question were so grievous and so inconsistent 
with the requirement set forth in Pioneer Dodge, supra, and other 
related cases, as to allow the Trial Court to conclude, as a 
matter of law, that Appellant was not entitled to deficiency 
judgment against the Respondents. 
The Trial Court's Amended Summary Judgment should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -:::?/ day of August, 1983. 
DART & STEGALL GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
B. L. Dl\FT, ESQ. KENT M. KASTING, ESQ. 
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Plaintiff hereby supplements 1ts Motion to Set 
Aside or Amend the Summary Judgment and requests 
this Court to vacate said Order based on the further 
grounds that Pla1nt1ff can arrange tO reassume possession 
and ownership of the collateral or its proceeds which 
15 the subject matter of the Security Agreement. 
Plaintiff moves this Court that sale be held 
ln a reasonable manner w1thin 30 days. 
As grounds for th1s Motion, Plaintiff states 
that l t can obtain the col lateral for sale to protect 
the Defendants' 1nterest. The collateral is not 
the type to have d1min1shed in value and, in fact, 
have increased in value. 
By 0rder1ng the sale of the collateral the rights 
,,f the Defendants .... ill be protected and no pre Judice 
can result this disposition. 
Jn the alternative Plaintiff states that there 
'las been mistake and apparently the collateral 
'>as not been "sold" by the Plaintiff and, therefore, 
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sale occur thirty (30) days from 
be given reasonable fashion 
by the Court and that the Summary Judqment he ';,icat•' J. 
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